



CORPORATE RISK SERVICES

Security Risks Surrounding the U.S. Presidential Election

INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PART TWO
OCT. 29, 2020






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This report is the second in a series monitoring the security environment leading up to and during the U.S. presidential election scheduled to begin next week on Nov. 3, 2020. It aims to prepare businesses for possible contingencies during the election period and how these contingencies may impact physical security.

KEY POINTS

- G4S assesses that the U.S. election is unlikely to be determined on Nov. 3-4. Due particularly to the large number of postal ballots, the concept of 'election night' is no longer accurate.
- While the election process this year could be lengthy, Jan. 20 is considered a hard deadline for Inauguration.
- G4S assesses that a contested election is relatively likely and should be prepared for.
- Continued monitoring for security risks is highly recommended through at least January 2021. It is considered likely that continued vigilance and a heightened security posture will be needed through at least January 2021. This should only be relaxed upon completion of an updated security assessment.
- The primary security concern for businesses through January 2021 is considered to consist of the risk of protests. G4S assesses that it is less a question of whether these will occur and more when, where, how large, how violently and for how long they will occur. These are increasingly likely if/when political actions or rhetoric are made that are considered controversial by the public.
- Future protests are most likely (1) where protests have occurred most often or violently previously, (2) in state capitals, (3) in population centers and (4) where new developments occur.
- States that are particularly prone to protests include California, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas and Illinois. When protests occur, they have a higher likelihood of turning violent in Oregon, Washington, D.C., Washington, Minnesota, Arizona and Missouri. Moreover, violent protests have also been more frequent in California, New York, Florida and Virginia.
- Cities that are more prone to violent unrest include Portland (OR), Seattle (WA), Los Angeles (CA), Richmond (VA) and NYC – Manhattan (NY). Florissant (MO) and St. Louis (MO) also have a higher percentage of protests that included violence.
- Recent protest activity from the past month continues to show that protests are heavily influenced by recent, local events (for example, police shootings). Violent clashes have been observed particularly where counter-protests occur, when protests continue after dark, and in cities where violent unrest has been re-occurring between police and protesters demonstrating against the police.
- G4S continues to identify protests planned nationwide around common protest topics. These include calls to protests depending on how election events unfold, as well as white supremacy events (which pose a heightened risk of violence.)



SECURITY RISKS

The first part in this series largely examined the various security risks associated with the U.S. election period. Particularly notable security risks include:

Protests

Protests are considered the most likely security risk during the election period. These include mass protests and potential violent protests. Crimes committed during protests may include vandalism, arson and looting. Protests have the potential to restrict safe passage to sites (for employees, customers and/or goods). Large protests can cause delays to public transportation, traffic delays and the need to seek alternative routes (for personnel and the movement of goods.) Larger protests further pose a risk to delaying the availability and responsiveness of emergency services due to road closures and a shortage of available personnel.

G4S assesses a heightened risk of violent clashes during the election period, especially where supporters of both candidates are present at a location. This assessment is largely designed to examine different catalysts for protest activity.

Of note, there is some indication that the Republican Party and Republican presidential candidate President Donald Trump may be more able to mobilize or control supporters than the Democratic Party and Democratic candidate Joe Biden. Trump supporters have responded to his statements in the past (even when these statements did not necessarily intend their outcome), whereas many Biden supporters and demonstrators against Trump have rallied more frequently for causes that are not directly linked to Biden (for example, Black Lives Matters or general protest against Trump).

Isolated Violence

There is a relatively high likelihood of politically-motivated isolated incidents of violence (for example, vehicular ramblings, shootings, etc.) These have occurred in recent

months, rhetoric — particularly on far-right websites and the darknet — strongly indicate this and gun purchases have significantly increased (also attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic.) Due to their nature, isolated acts of violence are more difficult to predict the location/nature of, but businesses should remain alert and vigilant, especially if they are near protests, politically significant sites or are in some way linked with a candidate/party.

Concerns Over the Breakdown Of Law and Order

There are significant security concerns related to any perceived potential breakdown of law and order by the general population. This concern is reflected in online discussions, increased searches for such terms as “U.S. war 2020” on search engines, an increased rate of gun purchases (including by first-time gun owners) and weekly training and recruitment events by right-wing militia groups. This concern is further escalated by media coverage and statements by politicians (for example, Time magazine featured a story last month about rhetoric from former Trump advisors, one of whom is quoted as saying, “When Donald Trump refuses to stand down at the inauguration, the shooting will begin [...] If you carry guns, buy ammunition, ladies and gentlemen, because it’s going to be hard to get.”)

Concerns over a breakdown in law and order have the potential to:


- Cause fear and potential changed behavior amongst employees and customers
- Significantly impact supply chains (including food items and other goods)
- Lead to illegal behavior (for example, looting)

A sustained, widespread breakdown of law and order will hinge on the events that transpire through January 2021. G4S is not currently predicting such a breakdown, but the risk increases if multiple individuals are perceived as having a credible claim to the presidency (see Contested Election, below.) G4S will monitor for events that could increase this risk.

*Michael Caputo quoted in Bennet, B. (Sept. 16, 2020) ‘TRUMP Allies Raise the Prospect of Political Violence Around the Election’. Time. [online] Available: <https://time.com/5889425/political-violence-presidential-election/>, accessed Oct. 27, 2020.



TIMELINE

G4S assesses that multiple security threats are likely through January 2020 (see above Security Risks) and that the question is less 'if' these security concerns will transpire, but rather when, where, for how long and how violently. To begin answering these questions, this section examines the established timeline for a U.S. presidential election. This is also provided to help answer frequent questions and contextualize possible protest catalysts, which are indicated with an  symbol.

Of note for this assessment, President Trump has repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of postal ballots (calling them fraudulent and corruptible) and not committed to accepting election results, and Joe Biden has emphasized that he will insist that every vote (including postal ballots) be counted before accepting the election results.

Nov. 3 – General Election (Popular Vote)

Americans vote for their preferred presidential candidate and their running mate, as well as for their new members of Congress. These votes determine each state's electors (who form the Electoral College; see Dec. 14 – Electoral Votes Cast.)

In recent history, as votes are counted on election night, major U.S. media outlets announce the results, and once they judge that a candidate has an unbeatable lead in the number of states that they have won, the media 'calls' the election for that candidate. This is an unofficial prediction, and states generally conduct a certification process to verify the final tally, which can take several weeks. Nevertheless, these predictions have generally been accepted by the candidates, and there is an unwritten rule that the candidate who has lost gives a concession speech before the winning candidate declares victory.

This sequence of events is considered unlikely this year, due to a variety of factors, including especially the much larger number of people voting my mail [see Postal Ballots.] Officially, the first polls close at 7 p.m. on Nov. 3, and deadlines for counting votes vary by state and are as

late as **Dec. 12**. Moreover, deadlines to receive overseas and absentee ballots vary and are set between **Nov. 4-23**, and this year several states are accepting any votes that have been posted by mail on or before Nov. 03.



Protest Catalyst: Protests are possible on and around Nov. 3-4, including if/when election results are not announced on election night. Violence is more likely where there are counter-protests or supporters of both candidates present. The risk of larger-scale protests and possible violence increases if either candidate declares victory prematurely. Protests are also likely if there are allegations of tampering with the election (whether domestic or international.)

POSTAL BALLOTS

Steady Increase: According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, "the total number of voters who voted early, absentee or by mail more than doubled from 24.9 million in 2004 to 57.2 million in 2016, representing an increase from one in five of all ballots cast to two in five of all ballots cast [and the] number of U.S. citizens voting early more than doubled from nearly 10.2 million early ballots cast in 2004 to 24.1 million early ballots cast in 2016." In 2016, it took more than one month to count all votes.

2020 Elections: Due largely to the risks of COVID-19, experts estimate that approximately 80 million people are expected to vote by mail in the 2020 elections and that more than 198 million Americans are eligible to cast a ballot my mail. Due to COVID-19, certain states will require that almost all votes be cast by mail (including Washington, Oregon, California and Nevada.) Seven states are sending every registered voter a mail ballot, and another 34 states will allow any voter to cast a mail ballot without any excuse due to COVID-19. For the first time, most voters are expected to cast their ballots before Election Day

* U.S. Election Assistance Commission (2017, Oct. 17) 'EAVS DEEP DIVE: EARLY, ABSENTEE AND MAIL VOTING'. U.S. Election Assistance Commission. [online] Available: <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/10/17/eavs-deep-dive-early-absentee-and-mail-voting-data-statutory-overview>, last accessed Oct. 26, 2020.



Expected Delays: Counting mail ballots takes longer for multiple reasons. These include the time it takes to open envelopes, verify signature and in some states verify witnesses' signatures. In some states all votes also have to be enclosed in a secondary 'secrecy envelope' within the mailing envelope and several states don't allow officials to begin processing postal ballots before Election Day. Moreover, several states are accepting any postal ballots postmarked on Election Day. Previous recent elections have shown that there can be significant delays before all postal ballots are counted (for example, two congressional races in New York's June primary took six weeks before declaring winners). Overall, five states heavily relied on postal ballots for the 2020 primaries and took an average of 6.4 days to report results. It is considered extremely likely that delays will be even more pronounced this general election due to the very high expected number of votes by mail.

Partisan Divide: It is very likely that there will be a partisan divide in postal ballots. (1) More Democrat than Republican voters are requesting mail-in ballots, (2) public opinion surveys and several national- and state-level polls have found that Democrats are significantly more likely to use postal ballots than Republicans, (3) Trump openly and strongly criticizes postal ballots, while Biden supports them, both of which may influence voters and (4) states that voted Democrat in the last elections are more likely to have made changes to more easily enable postal ballots. This means that it is relatively likely that the results on election night will have a higher ratio for Trump than the final tally that includes all postal ballots (particularly in states that only begin counting postal ballots on Election Day, such as the swing states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.)

Fraud: While several politicians, including President Trump, have repeatedly expressed concerns about voter fraud related to postal ballots, election experts and studies into the phenomenon have generally found that it is fairly rare. Regardless, actual or alleged, fraud increases the likelihood of election results being contested (see below) and is a significant protest catalyst.



Protest Catalyst: Postal ballots are considered a very contentious issue, particularly due to the candidates' previous statements. Protests — including mass protests and a potential for violence — are considered heightened if either candidate declares victory prematurely before postal ballots are counted. Likewise, any legal contestations regarding the legitimacy of postal ballots have the potential to trigger protests, as do any attempts to discount postal ballots, or any real or imagined attempts to interfere with them.

Dec. 8 – Safe Harbor Deadline

Dec. 8 marks the deadline to appoint the 538 members who form the Electoral College. If any controversy or contest remains after this point, Congress is designated to decide which electors may cast ballots.

This stage in the process is generally fairly routine, but this year could be complicated (see Dueling Electors, below).



Protest Catalyst: Dueling electors are a potential protest catalyst, although they are considered relatively unlikely.

Dec. 14 – Electoral Votes Cast

With the exception of Maine and Nebraska, the candidate who receives the majority of the popular votes in each state determines that state's electors. The number of electors that each state receives is largely determined by that state's population, with a set total of 538 electors (i.e. 270 electoral votes needed to win an election.) These electors will vote on the president on December 14, generally determining the U.S. Election. While they tend to vote in accordance with the people's vote, this is not mandatory.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the candidate who wins the majority of the 538 electors' votes becomes the next President. Both chambers of Congress will meet on Jan. 6 to count the votes and name the winner. This vote supersedes any ongoing recounts.



Protest Conflict: One possible trigger for unrest this year would be if the electoral votes do not match a state's popular vote. Likewise, protests are possible if there is any ongoing disagreement on which electors were selected (see Dueling Electors).

Jan. 3 – Congress Sworn In

The newly elected Congress is sworn in on Jan. 3.

Jan. 7 – Jan. 19 – Contingent Election

IF (1) neither candidate has secured a majority of electoral votes, OR (2) a 269-269 tie occurs, a Contingent Election takes place. This is considered unlikely and has only taken place twice in U.S. history (1800 and 1824.) In this situation, the House of Representatives elects the next U.S. president (with each representative getting a single vote) and the Senate elects the next vice president.



Protest Catalyst: If the election process has reached this point, ongoing protests are considered likely.

Jan. 20 – Inauguration Day

Inauguration Day is set by the U.S. Constitution (this year set for Jan. 20, 2021.)

In the very unlikely event that a Contingent Election took place and the House of Representatives failed to elect a president, the newly elected vice president would serve as president temporarily until a president was elected by the House of Representatives. If neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate successfully concluded a contingent election, the Presidential Succession Act would determine the acting president until a president could be determined (this would go to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, followed by the president pro tempore of the senate.



Protest Catalyst: There is a heightened risk of large-scale protests on and immediately surrounding Inauguration Day, regardless of the events that occur before Jan. 20. There is precedence of protests around this event during previous elections. The scale and level of violence

will largely be determined by the preceding events. Any continued questions about the legitimacy of the presidency at this stage would likely lead to large protests.

CONTESTED ELECTION


G4S assesses that there is a high likelihood that the election results will be contested this year, with a higher likelihood than in previous years. This is based on a combination of factors, including recent statements by the candidates, their actions hiring large legal teams in preparation for this possibility and the likelihood that initial election night results will have a higher percentage in favor of Trump than the final results (due to the aforementioned partisan differences in likely voting methods.)

Recount: Following the popular vote on Nov. 3, either or both candidates can demand a recount in one or multiple states. Particularly due to the delays inherent in counting postal votes, this could take a long time to complete (even up to the Dec. 8 Safe Harbor date and Dec. 14 vote by electors.) The risk of one or both candidates demanding a recount is highly plausible.

Legal Challenge: Legal challenges can be made initially on a local and state-wide basis, with election law varying between states. This year these are considered relatively likely, with a high number of possible legal disputes, including voting irregularities, large numbers of mail ballots being dismissed due to inadvertent errors by voters and complicated state-level protocols (such as requiring witnesses' signatures in some states), postal ballot delays, as well as the overall legitimacy of mail-in ballots and election measures in certain states. Complex legal challenges may be escalated to the Supreme Court, as President Trump has suggested.

Implications: There is a significant risk that contestations could be ongoing up to the Dec. 8 Safe Harbor deadline and Dec. 14 vote by electors. As such, any contestation increases the risks that (1) there could be a dispute about which electors to select (including dueling electors) and (2) electors could diverge from the popular vote in their state (questioning the legitimacy of the voting results).



 **Protest Catalyst:** Any contestation of election results is likely to increase the risk of protests, including the potential for prolonged and/or violent unrest. Violence is especially likely if supporters of both candidates are present in a location. Protests are especially likely if there is widespread indignation against the contestation (for example, if there is a legal challenge about accepting some postal ballots and large numbers of the public disagree with this.) Moreover, should a legal challenge escalate to the Supreme Court, this could in itself be a protest catalyst due to the controversial nature of the Supreme Court this year (with Amy Coney Barrett joining the Supreme Court just one week before the elections; something that many Democrats argued was undemocratic and even illegitimate.) Furthermore, there is a risk of unrest if a dispute lasts up until the Dec. 14 Electoral College vote and in any of the circumstances outlined in the 'Implications' above.

Dueling Electors: Under Federal law, if a state's popular election has "failed" (which could be argued if disputes last up until the Safe Harbor date), state legislatures can choose the electors to represent their state. However, due to a relative lack of precedent and unclear wording in the relevant legislation (the Electoral Count Act of 1887), there is the low risk that more than one set of electors (i.e. dueling electors) are selected. In this case each chamber of the newly appointed Congress is responsible for deciding which electors to accept. It is further legally unclear what would happen if the two chambers disagree. The state's "executive" is supposed to make a final decision in this case, but it is arguable whether that refers to a state's governor or not. This could be escalated to the Supreme Court. This eventuality — although possible — is considered unlikely, but certainly represents a further potential trigger for protests if it were to occur.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

There are a countless number of additional factors that could strongly impact the election process and particularly the risk of protests. These include, assassination/kidnapping attempts targeting a candidate or other politician (there have been plots disrupted in recent weeks against at least President Trump and the Democratic Governor of Michigan), foreign actions against the U.S., a cyberattack targeting the U.S. and any real or alleged election tampering/interference (domestic or international).

Moreover, any official response to the aforementioned has a significant risk of impacting protests. For example, if the National Guard is deployed or the Insurrection Act is invoked in response to protests, this could quickly increase the scale of protests and the potential for violence. Likewise, if a fraud investigation into the election takes place and includes seizing ballots, this has the potential to significantly increase protests.

Any major actions by U.S. officials should be monitored. However, due to the countless nature of these eventualities, it is impractical to prepare for each. Rather, G4S recommends closely monitoring the situation, continued vigilance through at least January 2021 and preparing for overall security risks (see below).



PROTEST LOCATIONS

Based on the protests that have occurred so far this year, the strongest correlations in predicting the locations of future protests — including violent protests — are found to be (1) where protests have occurred most often or violently previously, (2) state capitals, (3) population centers and (4) where a new development has occurred (i.e. a new allegation of police violence, the National Guard being deployed, etc.) Additionally, the risk of violence significantly increases in the presence of counter-protests. Counter-protests are becoming more frequent, and there is a heightened risk of counter-protests during the election period.

Demonstrators tend to gather at common locations (e.g. downtown metro areas and public spaces, such as government buildings, police department headquarters/precincts and parks, as well as scenes of specific key events or incidents); they mostly stay within this vicinity. Each city tends to have common protest locations (for example, in San Francisco protesters often gather in front of City Hall, Union Square/Central Market and the Civic Center.)

G4S examined all protest activity recorded between May 24 — Oct. 17*, to help predict hotspots for future protests and specifically violent protests. U.S. states that have been particularly prone to civil unrest include California (1,666 protests recorded), New York (968), Florida (762), Pennsylvania (656), Texas (629) and Illinois (579). States with the most incidents of violent protests or politically motivated violence were California (116), Oregon (101), New York (52), Washington (43), Florida (32) and Virginia (32). Notably, 21.5% of protests in Oregon have been violent, followed by Washington, D.C. (10.5%), Washington (10.2%), Minnesota (10%), Arizona (9.9%) and Missouri (9.2%). See Appendix A for a full list of states by number of protests, violent protests and percentage of violent protests.

G4S next examined all cities that experienced five or more violent protests between May 24 — Oct. 17. Of

these, violent incidents occurred most often in Portland, OR (91 incidents), Seattle, WA (31), Los Angeles, CA (27), Richmond, VA (18) and NYC – Manhattan, NY (15). However, equally notable are which cities had violence occur most frequently when protests occurred. Cities which featured the highest percentages of protests that included violence were Portland, OR (47%), Florissant, MO (41%), St. Louis, MO (36%), Richmond, VA (30%) and Seattle, WA (24%). See Appendix B for a full list of cities that experienced five or more violent protests, by number of protests, violent protests and percentage of violent protests.

Figure 1 shows all protests that have occurred from May 24-Oct. 17.




Figure 1: Heat map of all protests from May 10 - Oct. 17, 2020




Figure 2: Heat map of all violent protests from May 10 - Oct. 17, 2020

* Data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) in conjunction with Princeton University. ACLED (2020) US Crisis Monitor. [online] Available: <https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/>, last accessed Oct. 27, 2020.



RECENT ACTIVITY

G4S reviewed recent protest activity to highlight hotspots of recent protest activity. When used in conjunction with overall protest trends from the past year, this provides insight into additional areas of higher risk. Recent protest activity from the past half month continues to show that protests are heavily influenced by recent, local events (for example, police shootings). Violent clashes have been observed particularly where counter-protests occur, when protests continue after dark, and in cities where violent unrest has been re-occurring between police and protesters demonstrating against the police.

Nationwide

Oct. 17: At least 66 'Women's Marches' occurred peacefully nationwide, demonstrating for a variety of issues, including especially to commemorate the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to protest Judge Amy Coney Barrett's nomination to the Supreme Court and to protest against President Trump. Thousands gathered in Washington, D.C., and hundreds in other cities.

California: Los Angeles

Oct. 17: Police fired pepper spray in an attempt to disperse several hundred counter demonstrators who gathered on Market Street to protest a free speech rally organized by Team Save America. Clashes also erupted earlier between pro-Trump demonstrators and anti-Trump counter-protesters at UN Plaza. Several people and three police officers were injured.

Illinois: Chicago

Oct. 22: An anti-police violence march took place in Waukegan in the afternoon hours to protest the fatal shooting of an African American teenager Marcellis Stinnette and shooting/injury of his girlfriend Tafara Williams by police officers during an attempted vehicle search. Local traffic was diverted and multiple shops were closed in the downtown area.

District of Columbia

Oct. 27: Police used tear gas and stun grenades against protesters following vandalism at the D.C. 4th District police station. Protesters demonstrated against the death of Karon Hylton, who died in a motorbike crash during an attempted traffic stop by police on Oct. 23.

Maryland: Frederick

Oct. 21: A suspect is charged with having threatened to kidnap and kill presidential candidate Joe Biden and vice presidential candidate Kamala Harris, as well as to target their supporters.

Massachusetts: Boston

Oct. 18: Dual counter-protests between members of groups Super Happy Fun America and Solidarity Against Hate - Boston took place outside the Boston Public Library in Copley Square. Skirmishes were reported and at least two protesters were arrested.

Minnesota: Minneapolis-St. Paul

Oct. 22: Hennepin County District Judge Peter Cahill dismissed a third-degree murder count against former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin, who remains charged with second-degree unintentional murder and second-degree manslaughter in the death of George Floyd.

New York: New York

Oct. 27: Around 30 people were arrested after protesters smashed windows, vandalized NYPD police cars, set fires and drove a car through a line of police officers during the evening hours. About 200 people marched through Boerum Hill before surrounding them on Atlantic Ave. near Boerum Place at 10 p.m. Fires were reported along Court St. from Atlantic Ave. to Montague St. and the Christopher Columbus statue outside Brooklyn Supreme Court was vandalized.



New York: Rochester

Oct. 17: Protesters calling for justice for Daniel Prude shut down a stretch of I-490 eastbound near Brown Street. Two people were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.

Oregon: Portland

Oct. 17: 19-20: Approx. 100 individuals demonstrated the police and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) over three evenings. On Oct. 17 protesters threw rocks and other projectiles at officers while the police responded with pepper balls and tear gas. On Oct. 19 a pro-police billboard next to the Portland Police Association office was set on fire, and on Oct. 20 protesters clashed with federal agents and two arrests were made.

Pennsylvania: Philadelphia

Oct. 27: Nearly a dozen people were shot overnight after a second consecutive night of looting and rioting in several areas, particularly Port Richmond. Some of the gunfire allegedly involved looters shooting at other looters. Approximately 1,000 people demonstrated for justice for Walter Wallace, Jr. Police used pepper spray and batons on demonstrators, and at least 23 were injured. The Pennsylvania National Guard as well as police reinforcements have been deployed. Businesses around the city have closed early and set up barricades. A citywide curfew was put in effect for Oct. 28-29.

Oct. 26: At least 30 police officers were injured (including one struck by a pickup truck) and 91 people were arrested in overnight protests in the area of 52nd and Walnut streets in the Cobbs Creek neighborhood following a police shooting of 27-year-old Walter Wallace, Jr., earlier in the afternoon. More than 300 people protested. Those arrested were charged with rioting, assault on police officers and looting and possession of firearms.

Rhode Island: Providence

Oct. 20-21: Hundreds of people protested on Tuesday at the Providence Public Safety Complex and at the Knight Memorial Library in support of Jhamal Gonsalves, a moped rider who remained in critical condition after crashing while being trailed by police on Oct. 18. Protesters outside the Public Safety Complex set off fireworks and threw objects at police. Around 20 people were reported arrested. Dozens gathered the next night at Sackett Street Park and marched to Elmwood Avenue.

Utah: Salt Lake City

Oct. 21: About 40 protesters marched from Washington Square and surrounded the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office after the District Attorney announced that charges would not be filed against the former police officer in charge of the extortion case of Lauren McCluskey, a student who was murdered in October 2018.

Washington: Seattle

Oct. 17: Protesters gathered on Capitol Hill, with some marches leaving Seattle Central and traveling through neighborhood streets. A small fire was set near 12th and Remington, and protesters threw rocks at police and caused minor acts of vandalism and property damage. At least five people were arrested.



PLANNED PROTESTS

G4S continues to identify protests planned nationally around common protest topics, including but not limited to support or opposition for either presidential candidate, Black Lives Matter, allegations of police brutality and demonstrations to show support for police officers.

There are also initial calls for protests specifically related to how election events unfold. For example, a protest called “Occupy the streets if election is stolen: Protest for a people’s mandate” has been scheduled in New York City on Nov. 4.*




Figure 3: Planned ‘Occupy the streets if election is stolen’ protest in New York City.

There have also been white supremacist demonstrations identified, which pose a heightened risk of violence, particularly if counter-protests take place. This includes an ‘End White Silence Ally Rally & March’ scheduled for Nov. 7 in Louisville, Kentucky.**



Figure 4: Planned ‘End White Silence Ally Rally & March’ protest in Louisville

Moreover, there are also indications of coordinated nationwide protests being planned. One example of this is Anonymous’ ‘Million Mask March.’ This annual, global event is generally organized to highlight human rights abuses, protest government surveillance and government infringements/restrictions on the Internet, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. However, the annual protest is strongly influenced by the movie *V For Vendetta*, which features demonstrators wearing Guy Fawkes Masks rising together to protest the government on Guy Fawkes Night (Nov. 5). Because this event takes place directly after the U.S. election this year, it could draw larger numbers who are protesting the Trump administration directly. The largest protest in the U.S. is expected in Washington, D.C., with further gatherings possible in major cities. Currently, the Facebook event for the D.C. gathering has approx. 200 individuals registered as planning to attend and a further 550 indicating interest. However, with only 2,655 members registered on the Discord channel, the “million” in its title is not indicative of likely protest numbers.***

* Struggle – La Lucha for Socialism (2020) ‘Occupy the streets if election is stolen: Protest for a people’s mandate’. Facebook. [online] Available: <https://www.facebook.com/events/1325936021192092/>, last accessed Oct. 27, 2020.

** WRATH White Radicals Against Thoughtless Hate (2020) ‘End White Silence Ally Rally & March’. Facebook. [online] Available: <https://www.facebook.com/events/829786334232303/>, last accessed Oct. 27, 2020.

*** Anonymous (2020, Oct. 22) ‘It’s TIME! Anonymous Million Mask March. Anonymous. [online] Available: <https://anewspost.com/its-time-anonymous-million-mask-march/>, last accessed Oct. 27, 2020.



RECOMMENDATIONS

While the first G4S U.S. Election assessment provided recommendations related to the days immediately surrounding the U.S. election on Nov. 3, the following are general recommendations for the entire election period through January 2021 (not specific to election night.) These recommendations are particularly geared toward businesses with locations near previous protest hotspots or where future protests are planned.

- G4S emphasizes the potential need for **continued monitoring and vigilance** through at least January 2021.
- It is considered relatively likely that a **heightened security posture** will be needed through at least January 2021. This should only be relaxed upon completion of an updated security assessment (for example, if the U.S. election transpires smoothly and there is a lower than expected rate of protests.)
- Protests can change quickly and companies are urged to monitor local police social media feeds and reach out to G4S Security Risk Operations Center for situational updates. In addition to potentially closing businesses in the days immediately surrounding Nov. 03, G4S recommends **preparing for additional business closures** if/when protest activity increases (see Timeline for election events that could trigger larger protests.)
- **Transportation routes should be reviewed and contingency plans made** with alternative backup routes, particularly if the primary route comes near the aforementioned higher risk areas. This is especially the case when moving people or goods after dark.
- All **unsecure motor vehicles should be moved ahead of any planned protests in the area**. If facilities do not have secure parking (underground garage or fenced in) any vehicles left in open parking lots or on the street should be moved, if it is safe to do so.
- Businesses should **remove any unattended merchandise** or other valuables that are not well secured ahead of any planned protests and either stow them in a non-visible, non-accessible location, or move them off-site if possible and if it is safe to do so.
- Companies with business sites near planned protests should **assess the outside of their critical infrastructure** to see if there are any unsecure objects that could be used by individuals for blockades or projectiles. These items should be removed and secured. If renting, work with the landlord to secure items or mitigate access to them.
- Businesses should **review emergency procedures with staff members**. Employees who may be working at business sites should not be alone and be prepared with an evacuation plan if needed. Employees should remember that emergency services response times may be impacted in areas where there are protests.
- Businesses should **ensure that all smoke detectors are functioning, fire extinguishers are available and exit doors are clear and working** and plan for possible delays to emergency response times.
- Employees at business facilities should continually monitor **local news coverage** to stay up to date on any nearby protests and any breaking events. The default should be to act with extreme caution and leave sooner rather than later.
- **No employees should be at facilities after dark when there are ongoing protests in the area** until the situation appears to be calming down. G4S security and intelligence analysts, after a review of protests during the summer, noted that most acts of violence — clashes with police, clashes among individuals, vandalism, looting and arson — occurred in the evening and night. If physical presence is absolutely necessary near a protest site, additional security measures should be adopted to ensure employee safety. G4S is able to provide tailored assessments for this purpose.



- Business facilities within a 15-20 block radius of protests should **consider locking doors and covering up any large glass windows** that face the street.
- Companies may wish to remind employees of the **risk associated with political stickers on personal cars** parked near busy streets or other highly transited areas that could become easy targets for property damage and vandalism.
- Companies may want to consider the presence of any political signs on their property that could highlight their business as a target for property damage and vandalism.

METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

This intelligence assessment relies on an analysis of intelligence gathered via open-source networks such as online search engines, media and social media pages. Darknet sources were also reviewed. All information was found through the surface and deep web, unless the dark web is specified as a source.

This report is analytical and should be viewed as a method for preparing for potential security risks rather than a list of guaranteed outcomes. This report is intended for a wide audience and individual businesses' risks will vary depending on their business type, key leadership and the locations of their assets. G4S is able to provide tailored risk assessments upon request.

This assessment is not intended to examine how different political policies or ideologies may impact businesses.

Data on previous protests and political violence is largely taken from the dataset provided by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) in conjunction with Princeton University and has been added to and analyzed by G4S. 'Violent incidents' and 'violent protests' referred to in the Protest Locations section include violent demonstrations, protests that involved excessive force against protesters, attacks (related to protests), mob violence, riots, armed clashes and sexual violence (related to protests).



APPENDIX A: PROTESTS IN U.S. STATES

G4S examined all protest activity recorded from May 24 – Oct. 17. The following shows the number of protests recorded in each state, the number of violent protests or politically-motivated violence and the percentage of protests that were violent or contained violence. In this case, violent incidents include violent demonstrations, protests that involved excessive force against protesters, attacks, mob violence, riots, armed clashes and sexual violence linked to protests.

State	# Protests	# Violence	% Violence
Alabama	211	5	2.37%
Alaska	64	0	0.00%
Arizona	182	18	9.89%
Arkansas	117	6	5.13%
California	1666	116	6.96%
Colorado	291	19	6.53%
Connecticut	310	7	2.26%
Delaware	52	2	3.85%
District of Columbia	105	11	10.48%
Florida	762	32	4.20%
Georgia	372	18	4.84%
Hawaii	74	3	4.05%
Idaho	89	1	1.12%
Illinois	579	21	3.63%
Indiana	256	19	7.42%
Iowa	192	13	6.77%
Kansas	137	6	4.38%
Kentucky	280	16	5.71%
Louisiana	191	3	1.57%
Maine	143	5	3.50%
Maryland	255	5	1.96%
Massachusetts	448	8	1.79%
Michigan	450	10	2.22%
Minnesota	220	22	10.00%
Mississippi	119	2	1.68%

State	# Protests	# Violence	% Violence
Missouri	336	31	9.23%
Montana	79	0	0.00%
Nebraska	102	4	3.92%
Nevada	111	6	5.41%
New Hampshire	59	1	1.69%
New Jersey	292	6	2.05%
New Mexico	153	11	7.19%
New York	968	52	5.37%
North Carolina	480	31	6.46%
North Dakota	37	1	2.70%
Ohio	485	16	3.30%
Oklahoma	144	7	4.86%
Oregon	470	101	21.49%
Pennsylvania	656	23	3.51%
Rhode Island	80	4	5.00%
South Carolina	200	5	2.50%
South Dakota	32	1	3.13%
Tennessee	319	14	4.39%
Texas	629	25	3.97%
Utah	139	6	4.32%
Vermont	102	0	0.00%
Virginia	419	32	7.64%
Washington	423	43	10.17%
West Virginia	104	1	0.96%
Wisconsin	378	22	5.82%
Wyoming	53	1	1.89%

Data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) in conjuncture with Princeton University. ACLED (2020) US Crisis Monitor. [online] Available: <https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/>, last accessed Oct. 27, 2020.



APPENDIX B: PROTESTS IN U.S. CITIES

G4S examined all protest activity recorded between May 24 – Oct. 17. The following shows the number of protests recorded in each city that experienced five or more violent protests, including the number of violent protests or politically-motivated violence and the percentage of protests that were violent or contained violence. In this case, violent incidents include violent demonstrations, protests that involved excessive force against protesters, attacks, mob violence, riots, armed clashes and sexual violence linked to protests.

City	# Protests	# Violence	% Violence
Phoenix	71	8	11.27%
Little Rock	37	5	13.51%
Bakersfield	37	7	18.92%
Los Angeles	125	27	21.60%
Oakland	53	8	15.09%
Sacramento	70	10	14.29%
Denver	84	11	13.10%
Washington DC	105	11	10.48%
Miami	56	5	8.93%
Tampa	48	5	10.42%
Atlanta	78	12	15.38%
Chicago	131	8	6.11%
Fort Wayne	22	5	22.73%
Indianapolis	42	5	11.90%
Des Moines	51	6	11.76%
Louisville	95	14	14.74%
Minneapolis	60	10	16.67%
Florissant	17	7	41.18%
Kansas City	66	7	10.61%

City	# Protests	# Violence	% Violence
Saint Louis	25	9	36.00%
Albuquerque	53	8	15.09%
Brooklyn	104	8	7.69%
Manhattan	132	15	11.36%
Rochester	53	6	11.32%
Asheville	28	5	17.86%
Charlotte	50	10	20.00%
Durham	32	6	18.75%
Columbus	49	6	12.24%
Eugene	50	5	10.00%
Portland	192	91	47.40%
Philadelphia	108	8	7.41%
Austin	55	5	9.09%
Salt Lake City	76	5	6.58%
Richmond	60	18	30.00%
Seattle	127	31	24.41%
Kenosha	35	5	14.29%
Madison	56	5	8.93%
Milwaukee	73	5	6.85%



CORPORATE RISK SERVICES

G4S SECURITY RISK OPERATIONS CENTER

For questions regarding this report or for immediate assistance, please call:

G4S Security Risk Operations Center: (866) 604-1226
Alternate Phone: (866) 943-8892

g4s.us

G4S Security Risk Operations Center services include:

- Crisis Management and Incident Response
- Executive Protection Support
- 24/7/365 Employee Assistance
- GSOC as a Service (GSOCaaS)
- Intelligence as a Service
- Remote Video Monitoring